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Product differentiation strategy and vertical integration:  
An application to the DOC Rioja wine industry  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT. This study evaluates the importance of product differentiation as a determinant of 
vertical integration in firms. The proposed model also controls for known determinants of 
integration, such as transaction costs and firm-level capabilities. By identifying transaction-, 
firm- and strategy-level determinants, we derive testable predictions about the vertical 
integration decision. To test these predictions we analyze the Rioja wine industry, using a 
representative sample of 187 firms. Our paper concludes that reaching judicious vertical 
integration decisions requires a thorough analysis of some very diverse aspects, especially those 
related to mitigating opportunism, dealing with unforeseen contingencies and product 
differentiation.  
Keywords: transaction cost economics, resource based view, product differentiation, vertical 
integration.  
JEL: L22 
 
1. Introduction 
The organizational field of study is largely concerned with explaining firm boundaries, 
and this is an issue of great strategic importance for managers (Leiblein et al. 2002; Díez-Vial 
2007). Indeed, understanding why some firms produce a good or service themselves, while 
others outsource this to another organization, is one of the central issues in industrial 
organization.  
Many explanations for vertical integration decisions have been offered. In the strategic 
management literature it is argued that a high degree of vertical integration between the links in 
the value chain is important for quality control and innovation (Porter 1980). However, some 
economists have argued that vertical integration decisions are based on reducing transaction 
costs. As asset specificity becomes significant, bilateral dependence increases and vertical 
integration will be relatively more efficient because of its coordination capacity (Williamson 
1979). Finally, the basic assumption underlying the resource-based view is that vertical 
integration may be adopted by a firm to create a competitive advantage and increase the chance 
of being able to appropriate economic rents and protect rare, difficult to imitate and costly 
resources (Barney 2002).  
While all these points of view have contributed to our understanding of the vertical 
boundaries of a firm, each approach offers managerial suggestions that on their own are 
incomplete. We argue that each theory could lead to sub-optimal performance if followed in 
isolation.  
This paper tries to improve upon the prescriptions in the literature by constructing and 
testing a model that integrates several approaches into a single framework. In doing so, the 
paper extends the empirical literature on vertical integration by examining the relative economic 
and statistical importance of the prescriptions associated with the strategic management 
literature, transaction cost economics and the capability-based approach. We seek to provide a 
comprehensive and accurate understanding of how firms establish their vertical boundaries and 
resolve the trade-offs involved in the different explanations.    
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 2
Many of the empirical studies on vertical integration that use as their foundation the 
transaction cost economics approach have found support for the theory’s main hypotheses. In 
comparison with transaction cost economics, there are far fewer empirical papers examining the 
effects of a firm’s capabilities on its vertical boundaries. Some recent studies of this type have 
suggested that vertical integration is conditioned not only by transaction costs, but also by 
production cost differences (Argyres 1996). Finally, in the strategic management literature most 
studies have focused on specific strategic issues associated with vertical integration in the value 
chain. These include an improved ability to differentiate the product and greater product and 
process quality (e.g., Kumpe, Bolwijn 1988). It is therefore remarkable that the empirical 
literature throws so little light on how product differentiation motivates firms to integrate 
vertically. This paper helps to fill this gap by analysing the role that product differentiation 
strategies play, over and above the other factors, in determining vertical integration.  
In other words, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which a firm’s product 
differentiation strategy determines its vertical integration, accounting for other well-known 
determinants from the transaction cost economics and resource-based approaches. We test our 
hypotheses on the Rioja wine industry. This industry offers some benefits as a research study. 
Its main input (grapes) is a non-standardized supply; it is an important and internationally 
respected wine producing region; vertical product differentiation may be objectively 
determined; it offers enough variability among firms; and, finally, it is a bounded industry so a 
highly representative sample is achievable.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework for 
understanding vertical integration decisions. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used 
to test the hypotheses. A discussion of the results is set out in section 4. Finally, section 5 
presents the main conclusions of the study.   
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Vertical integration and transaction costs 
Transaction cost theory maintains that there are hazards associated with conducting 
certain types of transactions in the market, and that these types of transactions will therefore be 
performed more efficiently within a firm (Coase 1937). Williamson (1985) and Klein et al. 
(1978) suggest that the main contractual hazard is hold-up, whereby the party whose 
investments in the transaction can be freely transferred elsewhere expropriates quasi-rents from 
the party investing in transaction-specific assets that are non-valuable in alternative uses. 
Transaction cost theory predicts that internalization, or hierarchy, may reduce the potential for 
such opportunistic behaviour by reducing the incentive for contracting parties to engage in hold-
up. This is in part through creating an environment in which “adaptive, sequential decision-
making” supported by the threat of fiat may occur, and where the courts forbear from 
intervening (Williamson 1975; 1991). Internalization, however, implies added bureaucratic 
costs and reduced incentives (Williamson 1985).  Therefore, we can advance that:  
Hypothesis 1: The greater the potential transaction specificity of assets, the greater the 
likelihood of vertical integration. 
An earlier model developed by Williamson (1975) proposed three other important factors 
that also drive integration decisions, namely transaction frequency, uncertainty, and small-
numbers bargaining.  
According to Williamson (1975), transactions characterized by small-numbers bargaining 
are also hazardous because such transactions are more subject to haggling, delay, and other 
strategic behaviour by the parties when contractual disturbances arise. Evidence to support the 
hypothesis that vertical integration increases as concentration in the supplier market increases, 
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 3
even controlling for asset specificity, has been obtained in various prior studies (e.g., Levy 
1985; Caves, Bradburd 1988; Leiblein et al. 2002). In terms of food industries, Frank and 
Henderson (1992) and Bhuyan (2005) find supporting evidence for vertical integration in the 
U.S. food manufacturing industries. The small-numbers bargaining hypothesis is therefore as 
follows:  
Hypothesis 2: The smaller the number of suppliers in the upstream market, the greater 
the likelihood of vertical integration by downstream producers.    
A basic assumption in transaction cost theory is that all transactions are conducted with a 
certain degree of imperfect information, which can affect exchanges.  
Environmental uncertainty exists when the circumstances surrounding the exchange 
cannot be specified in advance. This makes writing contracts more complicated, since the 
parties will have to devote a lot of time to trying to identify the various contingencies that may 
arise. Nevertheless, although transactions will be completed less smoothly than in other, more 
certain environments, the use of the market is still advantageous. Hence, unpredictability per se 
does not favour vertical integration, and only does so in conjunction with asset specificity 
(Williamson 1979; 1985).  This interaction effect between unpredictability and asset specificity 
has been identified by Anderson (1985), Coles and Hesterly (1998), Leiblein and Miller (2003) 
and Díez-Vial (2007). The following hypothesis can therefore be proposed:  
Hypothesis 3: In the presence of asset specificity, the greater the environmental 
uncertainty, the greater the likelihood of using vertical integration. 
A second form of uncertainty, linked to the difficulty of evaluating performance, is 
identified in Williamson’s later works (1981) as “internal” uncertainty. Contracting parties 
should be able to evaluate the service or product being exchanged. If performance cannot be 
easily assessed, the market will fail because there is no knowledge on what to reward and how 
to reward (Williamson, 1981). Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that increased internal 
uncertainty for a transaction will lead to the increased use of vertical integration. This general 
hypothesis has gained some degree of support in the empirical research (e.g. Anderson, 
Schmittlein 1984; Anderson 1985; Gatignon, Anderson 1988; John, Weitz 1988).  
Hypothesis 4: The greater the internal uncertainty, the greater the likelihood of using 
vertical integration. 
We use the term frequency to refer to the regularity of the transaction. For the purposes of 
this particular study, however, we do not measure the effects of frequency because all 
transactions that were examined occurred with the same frequency.   
Besides specificity and uncertainty, Williamson (1981) argued that other factors are also 
bound to have an impact in a given setting. In particular, Williamson (1974) points to 
diseconomies of scale as a factor limiting the degree of vertical integration. This is because 
internalization comes at the cost of additional bureaucracy and weaker incentives (Williamson 
1985). Empirical evidence has been provided to support this idea (Martin 1986; Scherer, Ross 
1990; Russo 1992; Bhuyan 2005). All of this leads us to consider the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: The larger the firm, the less the likelihood of using vertical integration. 
Vertical integration and firm capabilities 
The resource- and capability-based view of the firm emphasizes the management of a 
firm’s resource and capability portfolio as a key determinant in the configuration and 
boundaries of a firm. This view has provided additional theoretical and empirical explanations 
for vertical integration decisions. Within this framework, vertical integration decisions may be 
driven by a firm’s attempts to leverage and protect idiosyncratic capabilities. Argyres (1996) 
tested this theory using several examples from manufacturing firms. The findings support the 
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 4
proposition that firms outsource when suppliers possess superior capabilities, except when 
higher costs are acceptable in the short-term while capabilities are being developed in-house. 
Likewise, Poppo and Zenger (1998) empirically link the presence of skill sets to vertical 
integration decisions. Barney (1999) suggests that integration decisions are jointly determined 
by the expected cost of opportunism associated with accessing a factor through the market-place 
and the expected cost of creating that factor inside the firm. Hence, a firm with innovation and 
marketing skills, which are valuable and difficult-to-imitate due to their intangible nature, will 
be more likely to integrate than its competitors. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 6: Marketing-intensive firms are more likely to choose integration for their 
transactions.  
Hypothesis 7: Innovation– intensive firms are more likely to choose integration for their 
transactions.  
With the constant pressure to meet consumer demands and be competitive, firms must 
continually acquire, develop and upgrade their resources and capabilities (Wernerfelt, 
Montgomery 1988; Robins, Wiersema 1995; Argyres 1996). Hence, identifying the source of 
strategic resources and capabilities (those that establish and enhance a firm’s sustainable 
competitive advantage) represents one of the most complex challenges facing a firm. Although 
some authors ascribe capabilities to luck (Barney 1986), resources and capabilities are 
traditionally considered as the product of a history of specific routines developed experientially 
in the firm. They are said to develop cumulatively, as firms learn to perform routines over time 
(Nelson, Winter 1982). As a result, some authors hypothesize that a firm with production 
experience will be more likely to integrate because this provides learning opportunities that 
enhance its production capabilities (Leiblein, Miller 2003).  
Hypothesis 8: The greater the experience of the firm, the greater the likelihood of 
vertical integration.  
Vertical integration and product differentiation strategy 
Strategic management literature contains many studies that focus on a variety of vertical 
integration benefits that influence product differentiation. A common argument is that increased 
control over adjacent phases may enhance a firm’s ability to differentiate its product (Porter 
1980). We can distinguish between specific strategic issues associated with integrating forward 
and backward in the value chain. Whereas backward integration may allow a firm to obtain 
specialized inputs to improve or at least differentiate its final product, forward integration gives 
a firm better or more timely access to market information, allowing for more rapid or specified 
adjustments of the product to meet consumer demands (Porter 1980). Therefore, this strand of 
the literature argues that firms seeking product differentiation are motivated to vertically 
integrate because this allows for product quality improvements through control of the input 
quality and output distribution and service (Hill, Jones 2008). Based on this reasoning, we 
establish the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 9: The more differentiated a firm’s product, the greater the likelihood of 
vertical integration.  
 
3. Methodology  
Sampling and data collection 
In this study, our aim is to examine the motives for vertical integration in the Rioja 
Designation of Origin wine industry. The data were collected through the use of a structured 
survey. The population from which the sample is drawn consists of wineries that fulfil the 
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 5
following requisites
1
: (1) they belong to the Rioja Designation of Origin, (2) they are wine 
producers, (3) they are required to file accounting information with the authorities, and (4) they 
are not cooperatives. The survey resulted in 187 valid participants, 88.2 percent of the 
population. In order to limit the influence of external shocks, the study period is the last 3-year 
period. Most of the wineries in the sample (54.5%) are partially integrated, while 15% are 
totally vertically integrated and 30.5% are vertically disintegrated.   
Operationalization of variables  
A total of eleven determinant variables were operationalized. These measures were 
grouped into the three sets: transactional attributes, firm-level capabilities and product 
differentiation strategy. The following is a description of each of the eleven measures, by group:  
(i) Measuring transaction attributes  
For this set of determinant variables, we operationalized measures of specific assets, 
small numbers, uncertainty and size.   
We use seven-point scales, bounded by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”, to 
measure some transaction cost elements, specificity and uncertainty. The constructs were 
operationalized with a mix of original and adapted items used in previous survey-based 
transaction cost studies.   
Specific assets (Hypothesis 1): Asset specificity can take several forms. For the purpose of this 
study, we focus on physical asset specificity and dedicated assets.  
Two complementary measures of physical asset specificity were developed. The first 
measure is the degree of downstream physical asset specificity, which measures the total fixed 
investment by the producer. A second measure, the degree of upstream physical asset 
specificity, asked about the fixed investments made by the primary producer.    
Dedicated asset specificity was operationalized as the excess capacity that a primary 
producer has to support in case the grapes grown for a particular winery are rejected by it.   
Small numbers (Hypothesis 2). We used one item that asked producers how many growers on 
average would be willing to enter into contracts with them. Following Fowler (1995), instead of 
asking the exact number of suppliers, seven choices were provided on a scale where higher 
scores indicate a smaller number of available suppliers.  
Environmental uncertainty (Hypothesis 3). Following Williamson (1975), we highlight one type 
of environmental uncertainty, that of environmental unpredictability. The scaling of this concept 
is based on one item that indicates respondents’ perceptions of the environmental volatility.  
As we mentioned earlier, the presumption of market superiority is undisturbed unless 
assets are specific to a non-trivial degree (Williamson 1979). Following Coles and Hesterly 
(1998), this condition was operationalized by means of an interaction between a dummy 
variable (λ) and environmental uncertainty.  This dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the value 
of all specificity items is above 1 (the minimal value on the scale), and 0 for values of 1.  
Internal uncertainty (Hypothesis 4). One question, adapted from Anderson and Schmittlein 
(1984), addressed the perceived difficulty of measuring the results of individual growers 
equitably.   
Size (Hypothesis 5). We used the logarithm of the storage capacity of the winery because the 
variables based on assets owned by the winery are directly dependent on the decision to 
integrate production activities (Leiblein, Miller 2003).  
                                                
1 The population was drawn from the 2007 list provided by the Regulatory Council of the Rioja Designation of 
Origin.  
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 6
(ii) Measuring firm-level capabilities  
Marketing intensity (Hypothesis 6). We use the ratio of advertising and promotional 
expenditures to sales as a proxy for marketing communication intensity.  
Innovation intensity (Hypothesis 7). An appropriate indicator of a firm’s innovation capability is 
the intensity of its spending on research and development (measured by the ratio of research and 
development expenditures to sales).  
Experience (Hypothesis 8). We measure experience as the number of years of experience in 
wine-making.  
(iii) Measuring product differentiation 
Product differentiation (Hypothesis 9). In order to examine the effect of vertical product 
differentiation we measure the weight si of every product category (i
th) in total firm sales. 
According to the classification provided by the DOC Rioja Regulatory Board, the corresponding 
categories, ordered by value added, are as follows: Garantía de Origen, Crianza, Reserva and 
Gran Reserva. A firm with a high share in the latter two should be considered a firm focused on 
high willingness-to-pay products. A firm with high shares in garantía de origen and crianza 
should be considered a firm focused on low value added products.  
Following this classification, we calculate the quadratic2 shares of each type of wine in each 
firm’s total sales. The variables are referenced by appending a subscript (the name of the 
category) behind the name “Share”.  
In order to measure the dependent variable, the degree of vertical integration between two 
stages in the production process, respondents (wine-making producers) were directly asked to 
indicate the percentage of inputs (grapes) used that are internally provided. A Tobit technique 
was used to statistically relate the survey items to the vertical integration decision. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Although there are significant correlations
3
 between some pairs of variables, on the whole 
there is no indication of any major multicollinearity problems. Further evidence of a lack of 
multicollinearity is provided by the stability of the coefficients in the estimations across the 
models.  
Table I gives the coefficient estimates and goodness of fit measures for the nine 
hypothesized determinants of vertical integration using the Tobit estimation. An important issue 
with models is their stability. To test for this, different models were estimated using various 
specifications (Models I to IV). Given the stability of our results across specifications, our 
discussion focuses solely on model IV.  
INSERT TABLE I  
Our results provide strong support for some of the hypotheses deriving from transaction-
cost theory. According to hypothesis 1, the transaction specificity of assets leads to integration. 
This has been largely corroborated by the parameters for the upstream specificity of physical 
assets and dedicated assets. Conversely, the downstream specificity of physical assets is almost 
insignificant. Contrary to our expectations, the results fail to support the existence of a 
significant direct effect between small numbers and integration (hypothesis 2). Hypothesis 3 is 
confirmed, so environmental uncertainty is positively related to vertical integration in the 
                                                
2
 This corresponds to the disaggregated index of diversification suggested by McVey (1972). It has the form ∑
2
is , 
where si is the share of the i
th product in total sales.  
3 Table of correlations is available upon request.  
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 7
presence of a non-trivial degree of asset specificity. We do not find support for hypothesis 4, 
referring to the positive effect of measurement problems on vertical integration.  
Hypothesis 5 is that larger firms are less likely to internalize their input needs due to 
diseconomies of scale. As expected, the result for this variable indicates that size negatively 
affects a firm’s vertical integration decision. 
The findings in this paper do not support all of the hypotheses suggested on the basis of 
the resource and capability-based approach. According to hypothesis 6, marketing-intensive 
firms are more likely to choose integration for their transactions. We find weak evidence for this 
hypothesis (the coefficient associated with innovation intensity has p-value=0.052). With 
respect to innovation-intensive firms, our evidence fails to support hypothesis 7. However, our 
results provide stronger support for hypothesis 8, which implies that experience is significantly 
associated with vertical integration. 
In terms of the hypotheses linked to the strategic management literature, hypothesis 9 
predicted that a higher product quality mix would push transactions away from the market and 
into vertical integration. In particular, it was argued that the likelihood of market failure was 
most severe in exchanges that exhibited high differentiation based on product quality. Our 
results from model IV provide partial support for this hypothesis.  
As a robustness check4, ordered logit models that included eight choices for the 
dependent variable (Parmigiani 2007) were run, using all variables included in model IV, to 
replicate the tobit models. The results were quite similar, corroborating the robustness of the 
model.  
Our results provide evidence that a combination of strategy, transactional and firm-
specific factors appears to offer a useful explanation of the vertical integration decision of firms 
in the wine-industry.  
The incremental benefit from including each set of factors in the analysis can be 
evaluated through statistical significance. In this way, we can see that transactional attributes are 
highly effective in explaining vertical integration decisions (Nagelkerke’s R2=0.374). 
Transactional attributes contribute to the vertical integration decision in different ways. 
Consistent with transaction cost analysis is the finding that the vertical integration decision is 
stronger as asset specificity increases: firms integrate to avoid lock-in problems that may arise 
from large sunk investments. We find that upstream physical asset specificity and dedicated 
asset specificity have the appropriate sign and are statistically significant. However, 
downstream physical asset specificity has a much less significant impact on the decision to 
integrate these transactions. This result is consistent with the fact that increasingly a winery’s 
profitability is not limited to winemaking. Indeed, many regional winemakers diversify their 
winery activities in order to develop additional income streams through a commitment to wine 
and cultural tourism (Lumbreras 2004). 
The results fail, however, to support the small-numbers hypothesis, which is a less central 
prediction of the transaction cost model. This finding contradicts previous empirical work (e.g., 
Levy 1985; Caves, Bradburd 1988). However, this non-significant result could have at least two 
explanations. One possible explanation is that in the DOC Rioja wine industry there are enough 
suppliers available to make small-numbers bargaining problems a minor consideration. Another 
possible explanation is that our measure of existing suppliers is a noisy measure of the real 
supplier availability (Bigelow, Argyres 2007). Bhuyan (2005) also found an insignificant effect 
for small numbers. 
We also find support for Williamson’s (1985) proposition that environmental uncertainty, 
in presence of a non-trivial degree of specificity, raises transaction costs appreciably. Thus, 
                                                
4 Results are available upon  request. 
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 8
hypothesis 3 is supported. We also performed these analyses for the case where the dummy 
variable λ=1 when the values of all items of specificity is above 2, and 0 otherwise. The results 
of the empirical analyses were not substantially changed by altering the interaction variable in 
this way.  
The results provide weaker support for hypothesis 4, that increased measurement 
problems in the transaction leads to an increased use of vertical integration. This result 
apparently contradicts the findings of other empirical papers. However, unique features of the 
industry might explain this divergence. European wine growers and wine producers are based in 
small villages where people know about each another reasonably well through an efficient 
mouth-to-mouth communication network. Hence, the contractual parties have information about 
each other prior to entering into a relationship. Some of these parties are family members and 
others are introduced by a neighbour or relative. In such a circumstance, reputation certainly 
matters and it diminishes the possible effect of internal uncertainty, because those behaving 
badly would soon become known in the industry (Fernández 2008).  
Consistent with hypothesis 5, the size of the winery is negatively related to vertical 
integration. According to the transaction cost approach, the incentive for vertical integration is 
negated by strong diseconomies of scale, so diseconomies of scale could be a factor limiting the 
extent of vertical integration (Williamson 1974). Applying this argument to viticulture, the 
diseconomies of scale are generated by the distance between the vineyard and the winery. We 
know that a key aspect in improving wine quality is to control the entire production process, 
from vineyard planting to the finished product. When a winery needs large quantities of grapes, 
its supplier vineyards cannot all be next to the winery. Hence, in large wineries with the 
integrated production of grapes, managers would need to spend a lot of time visiting their 
vineyards. 
In order to examine whether the internal pool of capabilities really adds explanatory 
power to our model, Nagelkerke’s R2 was compared for model III and model II. The observed 
increase in Nagelkerke’s R2 was 0.085 and this demonstrates that firm-specific capabilities also 
increase the explanatory power of the model. In general, the availability or the creation of 
capabilities in the firm definitely increases the degree of backwards vertical integration. 
However, research and development expenditure is insignificant, so there is a lack of support for 
hypothesis 7. In keeping with hypothesis 4, the discrepancies could be due to differences in the 
specific characteristics of the industry, since innovation efforts in wineries appear not to affect 
the grape crop.  
In contrast, hypothesis 8 addresses the effect of experience on vertical integration. This 
hypothesis is tested using the coefficient of the term experience. This coefficient is positive and 
highly significant, which corroborates the hypothesis proposed.  
Finally, we have obtained support for the hypothetical relation between a firm’s focus on 
high value added products and the degree of vertical integration. This result is consistent with 
the classical Edmonds (1923) proposition suggesting a high quality or willingness-to-pay effect 
associated with vertical integration. In many manufacturing industries such a proposition has 
become weaker as advances in standardization and information technologies has allowed 
stronger de facto integration with external suppliers. However, the proposition retains its 
validity in the food industry where such advances have been less evident.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Understanding the factors that determine which type of transactions are undertaken 
through markets and which are undertaken inside firms has been an important theoretical and 
empirical issue in the economics and management literature. Although there is already 
considerable research on the determinants of vertical integration, this paper develops and tests a 
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 9
model of the vertical integration choice that contributes to the literature by analyzing strategies, 
transactions and firms’ attributes. The main results indicate that transaction costs, firm-level 
capabilities and differentiation strategies independently and significantly influence a firm’s 
vertical boundary choices. 
The results of this study are generally consistent with the existing empirical literature on 
the subject. Previous studies have suggested that entering new stages in the value chain is 
conditioned not only by transaction costs but also by production cost differences (Argyres 1996; 
Leiblein, Miller 2003). In keeping with these studies, we found that firms integrate to reduce 
transaction costs and to protect strategic resources and capabilities, among other motives.  
Similar to Díez-Vial (2007), we also found that transactional attributes are more relevant than 
capabilities in explaining firms’ boundaries. While this result appears to contradict other 
empirical papers, differences in the measures might explain this divergence (Leiblein, Miller 
2003).  
In addition to the transaction cost approach and the capability-based view, the strategy 
management literature appears to offer a useful explanation of the use of vertical integration. 
The influence of the product differentiation strategy on the vertical integration decision is an 
important distinction in our model. Our study suggests that firms that want highly differentiated 
products have a greater likelihood of internalizing production.  
The analysis presented here leaves some interesting questions about the governance mode 
choice unanswered. Our study focuses on vertical integration decisions in the wine industry. 
Thus, our conclusions and inferences from the results may be limited to this setting, rather than 
explaining the vertical integration choice in other industries. However, we believe that many of 
the factors found in the current study to be associated with firm boundaries also apply in other 
settings, particularly in differentiated-product industries with fairly non-standardized supplies.  
Another potentially complementary perspective for exploring the determinants of the 
vertical integration decision could be the economics of property rights (e.g. Demsetz 1988). 
With this approach, property rights to resource attributes consist of the rights to use, consume, 
obtain income from, and alienate these attributes (Foss, Foss 2001). As a consequence, property 
rights are important in viticulture because a vineyard owner’s ability to create, appropriate, and 
sustain value from it partly depends on the property rights that he or she holds and how well 
they are protected.  
A cross-sectional research approach was chosen for this paper in order to provide 
comparability with existing research on the vertical boundaries of the firm (e.g. Poppo, Zenger 
1998). The stability of the relationships between the attributes of a given transaction, relevant 
capabilities, and governance decisions over time remains an untested area worthy of attention. 
In the wine industry, it would have been helpful to have data on the wineries’ experiences in 
previous growers-wineries relationships. With this information, we could analyze how this 
factor reduces negotiation costs and allows wineries to develop capabilities of use when 
choosing and maintaining new relationships.  
While this study emphasizes the insights from the different views on vertical integration 
found in the management and economics literature, interactions between the different 
approaches are not considered. Given that we found some correlation between explanatory 
factors, it would be interesting in future research to test how these influence each other.  
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Table I. Estimates using Tobit for censored data at two extremes (0, 100) 
 
Variables Estimated parameters coefficients (standard errors) 
   
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Downstream physical specific assets     2.592 (2.177)    3.266 (2.079)     3.342 (1.886)    2.744 (1.805) 
Upstream physical specific assets     7.194 (2.360) **    6.741 (2.247)**     5.259 (2.039)*    4.620 (1.946)* 
Dedicated specific assets     5.869 (2.137) **    5.315 (2.036)*     5.533 (1.883)**    6.234 (1.857)** 
Small numbers     4.123 (2.373)    3.033 (2.278)     1.714 )2.084)    1.635 (2.024) 
λ*Environmental uncertainty   11.787 (2.579)**  10.296 (2.452)**     8.165 (2.252)**    8.975 (2.168)** 
Internal uncertainty    4.736 (2.395)     4.530 (2.292)     3.752 (2.098)    2.305 (2.079) 
Size  -11.351 (2.888)** -12.921 (2.671)** -11.426 (2.731)** 
Marketing communication intensity       2.124 (0.941)*    1.931 (0.985) 
Innovation intensity       2.875 (1.589)    2.008 (1.550) 
Experience       0.422 (0.100)**    0.370 (0.097)** 
2
ORIGEN DE GARANTIAShare        0.002 (0.002) 
2
CRIANZAShare        0.000 (0.002) 
2
RESERVAShare        0.004 (0.002)* 
2
RESERVAGRAN
Share        0.010 (0.004)* 
Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) R2 0.374 0.423 0.508          0.546 
Log Likelihood     -610.994      -603.294      -588.435     -581.029 
Chi-square statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ψ
 N=187 for all models   
Levels of significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01  
Parameter estimates for constants are omitted. 
λ It represents the non-trivial degree of specificity  
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